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STATUTE IN THE ABYSS: THE IMPLICATIONS
OF INSANITY ON WISCONSIN'S SLAYER
STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
The maxim that one cannot benefit from his or her crime permeates
both our judicial system and our society as a whole.' A central function
of the state is to prevent crime through deterrent mechanisms, such as
increasing the costs and decreasing the benefits of committing crime.2
By eliminating such benefits or reducing them in relation to a crime's
costs, the state makes the crime more costly to commit and the rational
criminal will have less incentive to commit the offense? It is for this
many states, including Wisconsin, have enacted
precise reason that
"slayer statutes."4
Wisconsin's slayer statute is similar to those of other states,5
directing that when an individual intentionally and unlawfully kills
another, that killer is not entitled to a share of the victim's estate, either
by way of will or intestacy.6 In the most basic homicide case, this
However, as
definition is sufficient to provide desirable results.
illustrated by an Indiana case, questions as to undefined terms, such as
"intent" and "unlawful," can make this section particularly difficult to
1. See Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 489, 490 (1986); see also Steinbarth v. Johannes, 144 Wis. 2d 159, 166, 423 N.W.2d 540,
542 (1988).
2. Madeline H. Morris, UniversalJurisdictionin a Divided World, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV.
337, 358 (2001).
3. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1195 (1985). When evaluating whether to commit a crime, the potential offender must
make an evaluation. See id. at 1195-96. He or she must weigh potential benefits of the
offense with the costs. See id. When the benefits exceed the costs, the offender will commit
the crime. See id. at 1196. By enacting section 854.14, the state prevents criminals from
benefiting from their crimes and attempts to lower the potential benefits of committing a
particular crime. See generally WiS. STAT. § 854.14 (2005-2006). Thus, crime is less attractive
and fewer crimes will pass the above evaluation, resulting in the reduction of the occurrence
of a particular crime. See Posner, supra, at 1196.
4. See Wis. STAT. § 854.14.
5. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.802(1) (2005) ("[A] person who unlawfully and
intentionally kills ... [a] decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under the
Florida Probate Code.").
6. § 854.14(2).
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apply and future results difficult to predict, in certain situations.7 This
uncertainty is increased by a lack of case law and legislative history on
the section.
An example of the problem occurs when considering the statute in
the context of a killer found not guilty by reason of insanity in criminal
court. Can one who lacks the mental capacity to conform her behavior
to the law commit an intentional and unlawful act in killing another?
Such a case recently arose in Wisconsin,' emphasizing the ambiguity of
Wisconsin's slayer statute in this particular framework. 9
This Comment analyzes Wisconsin's slayer statute in the context of a
recent local homicide and the probate matter that followed. Part II
provides the factual background of the highly publicized Van Lare
incident and the court proceedings that followed. Part III discusses
relevant precedent and examples from other jurisdictions. Part IV
considers the approach the Wisconsin court system is likely to take on
the matter based on relevant law and public policy. Part V evaluates a
variety of steps the Wisconsin legislature could take to achieve the most
favorable outcome. Finally, Part VI offers a conclusion to an issue of
law that is just developing.
II. FACTS OF VAN LARE
On the surface, Todd Van Lare seemed like any normal family man.
He was married with two kids, two step-children, a typical job, and good
social relationships.' ° But beneath the surface, Van Lare convinced
himself that his neighbors and co-workers were plotting to kill him."
These delusions drove him to distrust almost everyone and to kill his
wife in an exercise of what he believed to be self-defense. 2 On the
morning of November 1, 2004, just a few hours before he was to be
taken to a mental treatment facility, Van Lare killed his wife while she
7. Compare Turner v. Estate of Turner, 454 N.E.2d 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
that an insane killer did not have the requisite intent and, therefore, could collect on the
decedents' estates), with IND. CODE § 29-1-2-12.1 (1988) (declaring the Indiana legislature's
intent that insane killers not collect on their victims' estates).
8. See David Doege, Killer Committed to Mental Hospital, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Aug. 30, 2005, at lB.
9. See § 854.14.
10. David Doege, Cry for Help Turns Futile, Fatal,MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 23,
2005, at 1A.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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was sleeping. 3 He was found several hours later barricaded in the
basement with two of his children.'
Several months before the incident, Van Lare began suffering from
paranoid delusions.'5 These delusions forced him to quit his job, as he
suspected several of his co-workers were plotting against him. 6 As his
condition worsened, Van Lare suspected more and more people were
out to get him, and at the time he killed his wife, he trusted only his
parents and his sister."
The delusions took over Van Lare's life to such an extent that his
family frantically sought to find him treatment. 8 They visited several
psychiatric facilities, each of which provided differing opinions on both
his condition and the most effective treatment. 1" Among all these
variances were just two constants: (1) Van Lare's refusal to submit to
treatment at any of the facilities" and (2) the psychiatrists' beliefs that
Van Lare did not pose a serious threat of harm to anyone or himself.2'
Van Lare viewed the hospitals with the same level of suspicion he
viewed everything else in his life and was reluctant to trust any of them.22
When Van Lare finally found a facility he was comfortable with, his
family was ecstatic; he was finally going to get the treatment he needed.23
Unfortunately, that treatment did not come soon enough. On the
morning of the day he was to begin treatment, he was arrested for the
murder of his wife.24
At the criminal trial, four expert psychologists convinced the court
that Van Lare was not mentally fit, and thus should not be held
responsible for his actions. 25
The court found that Van Lare
intentionally killed his wife but was not guilty by reason of mental
13. See Doege, supra note 8.
14. David Doege, Defendant Will Fight Exam Results, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 7,

2004, at 5B.
15. See Doege, supra note 10.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Doege, supra note 14.
25. Letter to the Court, In re Estate of Van Lare, No. 2004PR119 (Waukesha County
Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2005); see Doege, supra note 8.
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disease or defect.26 Van Lare was committed to a mental institution for
inpatient mental treatment with the potential for conditional release
beginning six months later.27

Soon after this criminal verdict, Van Lare made a claim against his
wife's estate.28 In seeking to collect his statutory share of his deceased
wife's intestate estate,29 Van Lare argued that because he was found not
guilty by reason of insanity, he could not have intentionally killed his
wife, and that Wisconsin Statutes section 854.14 was inapplicable. ° As a
result, Van Lare believed he was entitled to his share of her estate as her

husband. 1 The estate asserted that Wisconsin's slayer statute was
applicable, supporting its argument by the finding of the criminal court
that Van Lare intended to kill his wife, though he was not guilty by

reason of insanity.32 Both parties noted the uncertain state of Wisconsin
law with respect to the implications of insanity on the Wisconsin slayer
statute.33
III. APPLICABLE LAW
A. The Wisconsin Slayer Statute

Wisconsin Statutes section 854.14 governs the process when a
decedent is killed by a potential beneficiary. 3 In those instances, the
killer is prohibited from receiving property transferred by way of

26. Order of Commitment, In re Estate of Van Lare, No. 2004PR119 (Waukesha County
Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2005); see David Doege, Man Who Killed Wife Found Criminally Insane,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 9, 2005, at 3B.
27. Id.
28. Response Brief in Opposition to the Petitioner's Proposed Order to Determine the
Succession of Decedent's Assets, In re Estate of Van Lare, No. 2004PR119 (Waukesha
County Cir. Ct. June 1, 2006) [hereinafter Brief in Opposition].
29. Van Lare sought all marital property as surviving spouse, the proceeds of a life
insurance policy on his wife's life as named beneficiary, and one-half of her individual
property as natural heir. Brief in Opposition, supra note 28, at 6-8; see WiS. STAT. §
852.01(a)(2) (2005-2006).
30. Brief in Opposition, supra note 28, at 6-8; see § 854.14(2).
31. See § 852.01.
32. Brief in Support of Petition for an Order Determining the Succession of Assets at 5,
In re Estate of Van Lare, No. 2004PR119 (Waukesha County Cir. Ct. April 18, 2006)
[hereinafter Brief in Support].
33. See Brief in Support, supra note 32, at 6; Brief in Opposition, supra note 28, at 4, 8;
see also § 852.01.
34. See § 845.14.
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inheritance, devise or bequest, or through intestate succession."

The

killer is effectively treated as disclaiming any benefit resulting from the

death? 6
In order for the statute to take effect, the killing must be "unlawful
and intentional."37 There are three methods by which a killing may be

considered unlawful and intentional.38 First, any "final judgment
establishing criminal accountability for the unlawful and intentional
killing of the decedent conclusively" meets this requirement.39 Second,
"[a] final adjudication of delinquency on the basis of an unlawful and

intentional killing of the decedent" establishes intent and unlawfulness. '
Third, "[i]n the absence of a [prior] judgment... ,the court, upon the
petition of an interested person, shall determine whether, based on the
preponderance of the evidence, the killing of the decedent was unlawful

and intentional."" Absent from the statute is any definition of the terms
"intentional" or "unlawful.""2
B. Relevant Wisconsin Case Law
The general doctrine that an individual should not be permitted to
profit from one's own illegal acts dates back to principles of equity in
the early common law. 3 This principle was officially ingrained into
Wisconsin law in 1927 in the case of Estate of Wilkins." Similar holdings
have continued in Wisconsin throughout the twentieth century in areas
such as joint tenancy," insurance,46 and marital property rights, with the
35. Id.
36. § 854.14(3).
37. § 854.14(2).
38. § 854.14(5)(a)-(c).
39. § 854.14(5)(a).
40. § 854.14(5)(b).
41. § 854.14(5)(c).
42. See § 854.14(5).
43. See In re Estate of Wilkins, 192 Wis. 111, 119, 211 N.W. 652, 655 (1927), overruled on
other grounds by In re Wilson's Will, 5 Wis. 2d 178, 92 N.W.2d 282 (1958).
44. Id. at 119,211 N.W. at 655.
45. In re Estate of King, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d 885 (1952). In In re Estate of King, a
man killed his wife shortly before committing suicide. Id. at 271, 52 N.W.2d at 887. The
administrator of the man's estate asked the court to grant the entire joint property to the
estate. Id. at 269, 52 N.W.2d at 887. The court issued a ruling based on the equitable
principle that one cannot benefit from his crime, granting the entire parcel to the wife's
estate. Id. at 273-74, 52 N.W.2d at 888-89. This decision was overruled in part in In re Estate
of Hackl, when the court rejected the idea that the entire property is transferred to the
victim's estate. 231 Wis. 2d 43, 604 N.W.2d 579 (1999). However, the decision was upheld in
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court in each case reaching the conclusion that the killer should not
benefit from the commission of a crime. 48 However, the issue of insanity
as a challenge to the intent requirement of this doctrine and statute has
not been decided in Wisconsin.
C. Wisconsin Legislative History
While Wisconsin case law has adhered to the principle that one
cannot benefit from one's own act of homicide for many years, the
doctrine was encoded in Wisconsin's statutes only a few decades ago.
The foundation of the present day slayer statute dates back to 1981,
when the Wisconsin legislature codified the common law principle that
an individual may not benefit from one's crime by amending several
existing statutory sections.49 These amendments directed that an
individual could not receive property from persons whom the individual
Included within these
intentionally and feloniously killedi 0
In re Estate of King to the extent that the killer is not entitled to survivorship rights in the
victim's portion of the property. Id. at 49-50, 604 N.W.2d at 583. Thus, the joint tenancy is
essentially severed in favor of a tenancy in common-like relationship. Id. at 49, 604 N.W.2d at
583-84. The Wisconsin legislature codified such result several years before the Hackl
decision. See WIS. STAT. § 700.17(2)(b) (1993-1994).
46. See, e.g., In re Estate of Wilkins, 192 Wis. at 121, 211 N.W. at 656 (referencing
numerous cases cited by the parties in which a murderer was not permitted to collect on an
insurance policy issued to her victim because of the murder).
47. Hackl, 231 Wis. 2d 43, 604 N.W.2d 579. Hackl killed his wife while the two were
going through a divorce. Id. at 52, 604 N.W.2d at 584. The circuit court imposed a
constructive trust on a one-half interest in Hackl's pension. Id. at 44-45, 604 N.W.2d at 58081. Hackl appealed, claiming that his wife's interest in his pension terminated upon her
death. Id. at 45, 604 N.W.2d at 581. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court decision
on the principle that a murderer should not be allowed to benefit from his crime. Id. at 45,
604 N.W.2d at 581.
48. See id. at 57, 604 N.W.2d at 586; King, 261 Wis. at 274, 52 N.W.2d at 889; Wilkins, 192
Wis. at 121, 211 N.W. at 656.
49. 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 1065-66; see WIS. STAT. § 632.485 (1983-1984) (preventing one
who intentionally and feloniously kills a person from collecting on a life insurance policy for
that victim); Wis. STAT. § 700.17(2)(b) (1983-1984) (severing joint tenancy and survivorship
rights when one joint tenant intentionally and feloniously kills another joint tenant); Wis.
STAT. § 852.01(2m) (1983-1984) (preventing an heir from collecting on the estate of a
decedent whom the heir has killed intentionally and feloniously); WIs. STAT. § 853.11(3m)
(1983-1984) (preventing a beneficiary who intentionally and feloniously kills a decedent from
collecting on her estate, unless the decedent's wishes would be best carried out in doing so);
WIS. STAT. § 895.43 (1983-1984) (preventing a beneficiary of a contractual arrangement who
kills the principal obligee from receiving any benefit from the arrangement); WIS. STAT.
§ 895.435 (1983-1984) (preventing a beneficiary who intentionally and feloniously kills an
individual from receiving any benefit payable as a result of the death).
50. See WIS. STAT. § 632.485 (1983-1984); Wis. STAT. § 700.17(2)(b) (1983-1984); Wis.
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amendments was the creation of section 852.01(2m), the section from
which the present day slayer statute derives."

This section, which was

incorporated into Wisconsin's general intestate succession section,
forbade intestate succession to one who intentionally and feloniously
killed the decedent.
In 1997, these amendments were repealed and replaced by a
reference to the newly created section 854.14.52 The language of the

applicable portions of the new section was very similar to that of its
predecessor (section 852.01(2m)), with two significant changes." The
first was a change in the term "felonious 54 to "unlawful."55 The second
was a change in the burden of proof of one challenging the ability of the
potential killer to collect from "clear and convincing evidence, 56 to a
"preponderance of the evidence."57
D. Slayer Statutes in OtherJurisdictions

While there has not been consideration of insanity with respect to
the slayer statute in Wisconsin, sixteen states with similar slayer statutes
have considered the issue."

Courts in these jurisdictions

have

interpreted language very similar to the Wisconsin statute in many
different ways 9 The resulting applications are scattered. Some states
conclusively determine whether sanity is required for application of the
slayer statute. 6° Others merely set a standard of intent and determine on

§ 852.01(2m) (1983-1984); WIS. STAT. § 853.11(3m) (1983-1984); WIS. STAT. § 895.43
(1983-1984); Wis. STAT. § 895.435 (1983-1984).
51. See Hackl, 231 Wis. 2d at 50 n.4, 604 N.W.2d at 583 n.4.
52. 1997 Wis. Sess. Laws 1428, 1440.
53. Compare Wis. STAT. § 854.14 (1999-2000), with Wis. STAT. § 852.01(2m) (1983STAT.

1984).

54. See Wis. STAT. § 852.01(2m) (1983-1984).
55. See WIS. STAT. § 854.14 (1999-2000).
56. See WIS. STAT. § 852.01(2m) (1983-1984).
57. See WIS. STAT. § 854.14 (1999-2000).
58. See Stephen J. Karina, Note, Ford v. Ford: A Maryland Slayer's Statute Is Long
Overdue, 46 MD. L. REV. 501, 503 n.20 (1987).
59. Compare Turner v. Estate of Turner, 454 N.E.2d 1247, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that an insane killer is permitted to collect on his victims' estates), with United States
v. Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847, 854 (E.D. Mich. 1950) (holding that an insane killer is not
permitted to collect on his victim's estate).
60. See IND. CODE § 29-1-2-12.1 (1988) (determining that a killer found guilty but
mentally ill may not enjoy the proceeds of her victim's death); see also De Zotell v. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 245 N.W. 58 (S.D. 1932) (holding that South Dakota's slayer statute only applies to
sane killers).
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a case-by-case basis whether a particular killer meets that intent
standard.6
Perhaps the most interesting state reaction to the impact of insanity
on a slayer statute occurred in Indiana in Turner v. Estate of Turner.62 In
Turner, a young man shot and killed his parents.63 The criminal court
found that he was guilty of the murders but not responsible by reason of
insanity. ' Soon after, the probate issue arose as to whether Turner
could collect on the estates of his parents. 61 Interpreting a statute very
similar to Wisconsin's current statute,66 the Indiana Court of Appeals
permitted Turner to collect. 67 The statute required that the killing be
"intentional," and because he was insane at the time of the murder, he
did not satisfy this requirement.'
Less than two years after the Indiana Court of Appeals issued its
ruling, the Indiana legislature amended the language of the statute,
excluding killers found not guilty by reason of insanity from collecting
on decedents' estates.69 In doing so, Indiana has grouped those who kill
out of insanity along with all other killers who are not able to benefit
from committing a crime.7'
Agreeing with the conclusion of the Indiana legislature, the Ohio
legislature created a statute with language similar to Indiana's amended
statute.7' The statute requires that persons found not guilty by reason of
insanity should not benefit from the death, regardless of the criminal
acquittal.72 All money, property, and insurance proceeds are to be
distributed as if the insane killer predeceased the decedent. 3 Thus, like
Indiana, Ohio has not given the insane individual any special treatment

61. See, e.g., Anderson v. Grasberg, 78 N.W.2d 450, 461 (Minn. 1956).
62. 454 N.E.2d 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
63. Id. at 1248.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1248-49.
66. Compare IND. CODE § 29-1-2-12 (1982), with Wis. STAT. § 854.14 (2005-2006). The
statutes are similar in that they both require any killing to be both intentional and unlawful in
order to prevent the killer from collecting from the victim's estate.
67. Turner,454 N.E.2d at 1252.
68. Id.; see IND. CODE § 29-1-2-12 (1982).
69. Karina, supra note 58, at 510 n.64; see IND. CODE § 29-1-2-12.1 (1988).
70. See § 29-1-2-12.1.
71. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (LexisNexis 2007).
72. See id.
73. Id.
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to receive benefits from a crime. 74
Similar in method, South Dakota has taken a clear stand on the
applicability of slayer statutes to insane killers. However, South Dakota
has taken the opposite position from Indiana and Ohio, applying its
slayer statute only to sane killers.75 In De Zotell v. Mutual Life
Insurance Co., the beneficiary of a man's life insurance policy sought to
collect on the policy despite having killed the insured.76 The court
indicated that the beneficiary, who was not insane, could not collect,
because a "sane, felonious killer cannot recover insurance money on the
life of his victim."" An individual found insane at criminal trial does not
fall within the South Dakota slayer statute. 8
In less direct fashion, several states have not explicitly determined
whether an insane individual can collect; rather, they have clarified the
"intent" requirement of their slayer statutes. Still, those states differ on
the requisite level of "intent., 79 Many states, such as New Jersey, have
simply adopted the criminal intent standard."
In these states, a
defendant found to act with the requisite intent in criminal court falls
within the reach of the slayer statute and is denied benefit from the
decedent's death. For example, in In re Estate of Artz, a young man was
charged and convicted of killing his mother.8 ' However, he was
acquitted on the basis of insanity." Upon determining whether he could
participate in the proceeds of his mother's estate, a New Jersey court
found that the criminal intent standard controlled the determination
under the slayer statute, and because the man was found insane, he
could not form criminal intent and was permitted to participate in the
estate distribution. 3
A similar standard is used in Maryland. In Ford v. Ford,' a woman

74. See id.

75. De Zotell v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 245 N.W. 58, 65 (S.D. 1932) (holding that South
Dakota's slayer statute applies only to sane killers).
76. Id. at 58-59.
77. Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
78. See id. at 65.
79. William M. McGovern, Jr., Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REV.
65, 93-94 (1969).
80. See, e.g., In re Estate of Artz v. Artz, 487 A.2d 1294 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
81. Id. at 1295.
82. Id.
83. Id.

84. 512 A.2d 389 (Md. 1986).
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stabbed her mother several times, resulting in the mother's death.85 At
the criminal trial, she was found not responsible by reason of insanity.'
The mother's will was admitted to probate, and the court ruled that the
killer, Ford, had forfeited her right to the devised property naming
another beneficiary. 7 The appeals court reversed, holding that because
she was criminally insane at the time of the offense, Ford was incapable
of forming the requisite intent required for murder and was not barred
from inheriting. 88 Ford was allowed to collect her share of her mother's
estate despite causing her mother's death.8 9 Several additional states
addressing insanity and slayer statutes, 90 as well as the Restatement of
Restitution,9 have adopted the same standard as New Jersey and
Maryland and allow insane killers to collect. 9'
On the other hand, Minnesota makes it easier for the insane killer to
collect on the estate of the decedent. 93 Minnesota case law holds that
one can be considered insane for purposes of collection on an estate
even if she was considered sane at criminal trial.9' In Anderson v.
Grasberg, a man who killed his wife was permitted to collect life
insurance proceeds despite a finding at the criminal trial that he could
distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the murder-the
standard under which criminal insanity was judged in Minnesota at the
time. 95 The probate court concluded that the killer was suffering a
mental disease and that the statute preventing collection did not apply
to such individuals. 96 Therefore, while considered sane under the
commonly used insanity test at criminal trial, he was permitted to collect
the insurance proceeds.97
Other states use a definition of intent that makes it more difficult for
85. Id. at 390.
86. Id. at 393.
87. Id. at 390.
88. Id. at 399.
89. ld.
90. See, e.g., In re Estates of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1979) (declaring
California's position that insane persons are not of sound mind and, therefore, cannot act
intentionally for purposes of the slayer statute).
91. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 187 (1936).
92. Ford, 512 A.2d at 400-04.
93. See McGovern, supra note 79, at 93.
94. See Anderson v. Grasberg, 78 N.W.2d 450 (Minn. 1956).
95. Id. at 461.
96. Id.
97. See id.
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the insane killer to elude the disqualifying effects of the slayer statute.98
In United States v. Kwasniewski,99 a man killed his wife and tried to
collect, as a contingent beneficiary, military benefits she was collecting
as the beneficiary of her son who had passed away years prior."l In the
criminal case, the husband was found not guilty by reason of temporary
insanity. ' However, the civil court handling the probate issue was

reluctant to consider this finding of insanity conclusive in permitting him
to receive the benefits."l

The civil court agreed that Kwasniewski was

temporarily insane at the time of his wife's death, but that he did intend
to kill his wife, despite his temporary rage.0 3 Therefore, the intent
requirement for the slayer statute was met, and the husband was
prevented from collecting the benefits he would have otherwise received
upon her death."l This result is similar to the updated Indiana statute,

where an individual may not have the criminal intent to warrant
punishment but is nevertheless denied receipt of benefits from the

event.05
Finally, thirty-four states, including Wisconsin, have not identified
the intent required, leaving courts in these states to navigate an unclear
path. °6
IV. How SHOULD VAN LARE BE DECIDED?

A. InterpretingSection 854.14
Under section 854.14, there are three ways in which Van Lare would
fall within the slayer statute and fail to collect on his wife's estate.'7 The
98. See McGovern, supra note 79, at 93-94.
99. 91 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
100. Id. at 848-49.
101. Id. at 850. The husband correctly suspected his wife of cheating on him and, upon
catching her with another man, shot and killed her. Id.
102. Id. at 854.
103. Id. at 852-53.
104. See id.
105. See IND. CODE § 29-1-2-12 (1982).
106. See Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389, 400-04 (Md. 1986).
107. See Wis. STAT. § 854.14(5) (2005-2006). First, any "final judgment establishing
criminal accountability for the unlawful and intentional killing of the decedent conclusively"
meets this requirement. Id. Second, "[a] final adjudication of delinquency on the basis of an
unlawful and intentional killing of the decedent" establishes intent and unlawfulness. Id.
Third, "[i]n the absence of a judgment.., or ...adjudication,... [a] court, upon the petition
of an interested person, shall determine whether, based upon the preponderance of the
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first method, a final adjudication assigning criminal liability, does not
apply in this case as Van Lare was not held legally accountable in his
criminal trial." The second possibility, an adjudication of delinquency,
does not apply either, as he was not found delinquent in his criminal
proceeding (nor could he have, as he was not a minor)."9 Therefore, if
Van Lare is going to be refused his marital share of his wife's intestate
estate, it will have to be under the third option: a court determination by
a preponderance of the evidence that his killing was unlawful and
intentional."0
Unfortunately, this is where section 854.14 ends,
providing no further assistance in determining what is unlawful and
intentional.'11
This lack of assistance is not overly concerning with respect to
unlawfulness, as it seems obvious that the homicide was unlawful. The
fact that the criminal court found Van Lare guilty of first-degree
intentional homicide indicates the unlawfulness of his actions."2 He
simply was held not responsible due to his mental state."3
The interesting question lies in whether the act was intentional,
specifically whether the finding of insanity conclusively establishes Van
Lare's lack of intent. As previously noted, this question depends on the
applicable legal standard of intent and whether this standard is met in
spite of insanity. Unfortunately, the legislature has not provided an
intent standard by which to judge the actions of the killer. Instead,
general discretion is left to the court to determine whether the killing
was intentional, with vague instructions, such as "preponderance of the
evidence""14 and "clear and convincing evidence."".. Such standards are
commonly used by courts in determining findings of fact or the
application of those facts to the settled law, but in this situation, there is
essentially a question as to the correct legal standard against which
those facts are to be evaluated.
Allowing such discretion in essentially determining the law is
dangerous for several reasons. Most obviously, the lack of a legal
evidence,
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

the killing of the decedent was unlawful and intentional." Id.
See § 854.14(5)(a).
See § 854.14(5)(b).
See § 854.14(5)(c).
See id.
Doege, supra note 26.
Doege, supra note 26.
See § 854.14(5)(c).
See WIS. STAT. § 852.01(2m) (1983-1984).
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standard leaves the issue to the determination of a particular judge,
lending itself to an arbitrary result. The final result seems to rest on the
subjective view of the trial court. This brings to the surface another
danger: the fact that this arbitrary result may be followed as precedent,
effectively setting a standard that may have not been intended by the
legislature.
Absent further legislative indication of "intent," the Van Lare court
will have to determine the requirement of intent in section 854.14. As
noted above, states addressing the issue have chosen among one of three
standards: (1) criminal intent; (2) a standard more stringent than
criminal intent, meaning that meeting the criminal intent standard
would not be sufficient; and (3) a standard less stringent than criminal
intent. 16 While it is unknown which standard was intended by the
Wisconsin legislature, some reasonable inferences can be made.
A review of the legislative history indicates two material changes in
the language of the statute in its evolution over the past two decades.
The first is a change from the word "felonious" to the word "unlawful"
in describing a criterion of disallowance." 7 The second is a change in the
burden of proof of the party opposing collection by the insane killer
from "clear and convincing evidence" to a mere "preponderance of the
evidence.".. 8 These changes suggest intent by the legislature to lower
the requirements for individuals to come within the section, resulting in
the inclusion of a greater number of individuals within the bounds of the
slayer statute. Whether this inclusion extends to insane slayers is still
unclear, but there is an indication of a broader inclusion of those who
are denied the benefits of slaying.
In identifying these changes, it reasonably can be inferred that the
legislature did not intend a standard more stringent than the criminal
intent standard. Legislative historical evidence aside, this standard also
defies the logical application of the maxim that one cannot benefit from
one's crime, as it may result in instances where a killer is found guilty at
criminal trial, yet is also allowed to collect benefits from the death."9
This would occur when the killer meets the criminal requirement of
intent, yet fails to meet the stricter level of intent as required by the
116.
117.
2006).
118.
2006).
119.

See supra Part III.D.
Compare Wis. STAT. § 852.01(2m) (1983-1984), with WiS. STAT. § 854.14(5) (2005Compare WIS. STAT. § 852.01(2m) (1983-1984), with WIS. STAT. § 854.14(5) (2005See, e.g., Anderson v. Grasberg, 78 N.W.2d 450 (Minn. 1956).
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statute.
Remaining, then, is the criminal level of intent and the standard that
denies benefit at some level below the criminal level of intent. Of the
few states that have considered this issue, several have determined that
the appropriate level of intent for the slayer statute is the criminal
level.'
These states hold that a conviction or acquittal in the criminal
trial is dispositive of whether an individual can benefit from the death.'
Criminal intent is defined in Wisconsin in section 939.23.12 It defines
"intentionally" as "a purpose to do the thing.., or is aware that his or
her conduct is practically certain to cause [a particular] result."' 3 Under
this standard, it is likely that an insane individual would not have
intended the particular act and, therefore, would not fall under the
restrictions of section 854.14. If this were the case, Van Lare probably
would be able to collect on his wife's estate. Though the court found
that he was guilty of first-degree intentional homicide, Van Lare was
considered not responsible due to his mental condition. Because he
could not recognize the consequences of his actions, he could not have
had a purpose to cause them.
However, various states have determined the intent standard to be
below the criminal level of intent."' These states hold that acquittal is
not dispositive as to whether an individual can profit from the insane
killing. 25 Thus, even though Van Lare was found not guilty by reason of
insanity, he may still be prevented from collecting under this standard.
This standard is a logical one, as probate disputes are civil, not
criminal, matters. At a criminal trial where the constitutionally
protected rights of the defendant are at risk, courts generally err on the
side of caution,' 26 enforcing tougher standards on the prosecution and
preferring to let a criminal go free than to convict an innocent person.
120. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389, 400-04 (Md. 1986); In re Estate of Artz, 487
A.2d 1294, 1296 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
121. See Artz, 487 A.2d at 1296.
122. See WIS. STAT. § 939.23 (2005-2006).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1950)
(applying Michigan law).
125. See id.
126. Sandra M. Ko, Comment, Why Do They Continue to Get the Worst of Both Worlds?
The Case for Providing Louisiana's Juveniles with the Right to a Jury in Delinquency
Adjudications, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 161,169 (2004).
127. Bryan A. Liang, Shortcuts to "Truth": The Legal Mythology of Dying Declarations,
35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 255 (1998).
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These same rights are not at risk in a civil matter. Furthermore, at a
criminal trial, one private party competes with the state, which is in a
better position to bear the cost of an incorrect decision than the
individual defendant. 28 In a civil suit, two private parties compete for
the same interest. If the insane killer is permitted to collect on the
estate, another private party is prevented from collecting that portion.
Therefore, it would not be unreasonable for a lower burden of proof to
be sufficient to sustain a verdict against a party in a civil case when such
standard would not be sufficient to sustain an unfavorable verdict
against that party in a criminal case. The fact that these suits are civil in
nature may lead the court to be less preferential to the insane killer than
it might be in a criminal trial.
To choose between these two standards, and even to completely
disregard the third standard as a possibility, would be pure speculation.
The legislature has given little indication of its "intent" standard, and
both of the remaining standards are conceivable options. Therefore,
consideration of the policy reasons behind permitting an insane killer to
collect on the benefits of the victim's death may be persuasive in
deciding the issue.
B. Policy Implications
A variety of public policies may play a role in determining whether
to permit an insane killer to collect. For example, one of the purposes
of law is to remove incentives for violating the law.129 However, if
someone is truly insane and kills out of this insanity, denying that person
access to benefits from the death will serve no beneficial deterrent
function."9 An individual killing out of insanity does not rationally
consider the effects his or her action will have or what benefits, if any,
will result from the killing. 31 This is the precise reason why such a
person is not charged criminally for the crime-the punishment will not
deter any behavior and will have no rehabilitative benefit.'32 Similarly,
128. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979).
129. See, e.g., City of Brentwood v. Cent. Valley Reg'l Water Quality Control Bd., 20
Cal. Rptr. 3d 322, 336 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that a basic purpose of law is to discourage
individuals from offending).
130. See Peter Arenella, Reflections on Current Proposals to Abolish or Reform the
Insanity Defense, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 273 (1982) (noting that deterrence of the insane is

highly unlikely).
131. See id.
132. See id.
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denying insane individuals the benefit of profiting from the incident will
not deter other insane individuals from killing. Therefore, not allowing
the insane killer to collect on the victim's estate will have no effect on
the killer's choice to kill, and ineffective law is pointless law.'33
Yet there are many policy reasons for limiting the recovery by
insane killers as well. For example, the purpose of posthumous transfers
is satisfying the intent of the decedent.' It seems reasonable to assume
that the victim of a homicide would not intend his or her killer to receive
a portion of his or her estate.'35 Certainly a decedent would not
contemplate his or her own slaying at the hands of an insane beneficiary
and, therefore, would not draft a will provision for such a situation.
Also, precautions are frequently used to prevent the direct transfer
of significant amounts of money to persons who lack the mental capacity
to manage it. Those who are incapable of handling large amounts of
money may receive it in trust, with the trustee authorized to use it for
the benefit of the beneficiary. Therefore, there may be a general
interest in limiting the amount insane killers receive, if permitted at all
in this situation.
Another factor may be the increasing skepticism toward the insanity
defense. 36 Justice requires that those responsible for breaking the law
be punished for what they have done, yet the insanity defense leaves
crimes without criminals to hold accountable, seeming to undermine
justice and accountability. Skepticism is increased by the fact that wellpaid experts try to convince courts and juries that those who seemingly
commit heinous crimes should not be held accountable because of
mental imperfections.'37 The common person may have trouble
believing in these alleged defects, something one has likely never
experienced.'

133. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of
Pandas' Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25, 28 (1993)
(speaking of the low to non-existent functional value of ineffective law).
134. Andrew L. Noble, Intestate Succession for Stepchildren in Pennsylvania:A Proposal
for Reform, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 835, 835 (2003).
135. Interestingly, this brings up issues of euthanasia. While it will not be discussed
here, there are situations in which a decedent may have wanted an individual to kill her and
that her intent would be to include that individual in the sharing of the estate.
136. Scott Leigh Sherman, Note, Guilty but Mentally Ill: A Retreat from the Insanity
Defense, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 237, 237 (1981).
137. See id.
138. Id. at 237-38.
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C. ProbableSolution

Based on the statutory language, treatment in other jurisdictions,
and policy considerations, a probate court in Wisconsin would likely
find the insane killer to be outside the parameters of the slayer statute
and permit collection of benefits from the killing. The majority rule
from other jurisdictions indicates that the criminal standard is the
appropriate one to apply, and Van Lare would not fall within this
standard, as he was acquitted at a criminal trial. Further, denying Van
Lare access to his wife's estate will not influence his future conduct nor
deter other insane persons from acting out of their own insanity. While
it may not be preferable to pass large estates to the mentally unstable,
doing so would consistent with the belief that people can be
rehabilitated and successfully assimilated back into society.
As hopefully demonstrated, the process engaged in above is far from
exact and represents nothing more than one individual's interpretation
of an unclear area of law. Nevertheless, it is similar to the process that
will inevitably occur in Wisconsin courtrooms absent further legislative
action.
V. LEGISLATIVE ACTION

This case is almost identical to the Turner case from Indiana. The
statutes read almost identically.139 The factual scenarios are very
similar."4 The results at criminal trial are very similar.' Considering
the above analysis, it seems that the results from Wisconsin's probate
court could be very similar, as well.
The distinguishing feature of these two cases lies in the action taken
by the Indiana legislature following the trial result.4 2 The state of
Indiana made a policy decision that it was not appropriate for someone
adjudicated insane to collect on the estate of the decedent.143 It
determined that mental condition aside, permitting anyone to collect on
the estate of someone they killed went against the maxim that one
cannot benefit from the commission of a crime.'" A modification was
139. Compare IND. CODE § 29-1-2-12 (1982), with WiS. STAT. § 854.14 (2005-2006).
140. Compare Turner v. Estate of Turner, 454 N.E.2d 1247, 1248-49 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983), with supra Part II.
141. Compare Turner, 454 N.E.2d at 1249, with Doege, supra note 26.
142. See IND. CODE § 29-1-2-12.1 (1988).
143. See id.
144. See id.
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made to the statute, preventing those who kill out of insanity from
collecting on the estate of the decedent.145 This was a strong stand in
response to a murky area of law.
The Wisconsin legislature is in the position to take a similar, though
not necessarily the same, stand to clarify this area of the law. The
legislature can do one of two things. First, it could take similar action to
that of Indiana, directly codifying whether an insane killer can collect on
the decedent's estate. This would certainly be the most preferable
option, leaving little room for error and providing for the clearest
results.
The second action the legislature could take is to simply define the
critical terms it uses in the section. When decisions are to be based on
the meaning of specific terms, such as "unlawful" and "intentional,"
such terms should be clearly defined as to their scope. This allows
courts to rationally and uniformly decide the issue. It may also save the
legislature from having to completely overturn what it considers
incorrect judicially determined doctrine, as seen in Indiana (although
better late than never).
VI. CONCLUSION

Not surprisingly, the Van Lare probate issue was settled during the
publication of this Comment.'46 While it is impossible to assert that legal
uncertainty was the sole cause for the settlement, briefs from both
parties indicated the lack of both precedent and clarity on the impact of
insanity on the Wisconsin slayer statute. 147 Although settlement and
closure may be best for all those involved, it would be unfortunate if the
decision to do so rested primarily on the vagueness of the law.
Absent any modification from the legislature, it seems reasonable
that strict application of section 854.14 results in the insane killer
collecting on the decedent's estate, as none of the three methods by
which "unlawful and intentional" killing is determined are present here.
However, the confusion is far from over. The only way to prevent an
arbitrary solution to this issue is for the Wisconsin legislature to provide
courts with guidance. Failure to do so will result in arbitrary application
of an uncertain law, leaving the issue in the hands of a randomly
145. See id.
146. See Post-Mediation Agreement, In re Estate of Van Lare, No. 2004PR119
(Waukesha County Cir. Ct. Nov. 29, 2006).
147. See Brief in Support, supra note 32, at 6; Brief in Opposition, supra note 28, at 4, 8.
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selected judge. For the sake of the parties involved and the sanctity of
the law, a standard needs to be set, whatever it may be.
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